I have always been interested in the philosophy of William James, especially his moral philosophy, which little is ever heard of. Over the years I have written a couple of papers in which I explore or make use of James's ethics (
"Foolish Little Children in the Eyes of Reason" and
"Believing in the Dignity of Human Embryos"), but nothing approaching a systematic account and appraisal of it. This year I'm going to teach, for the first time, an undergraduate seminar on James's
Pragmatism, which I'm hoping will prove a useful starting point for a more extensive engagement with his work. Preparing for this, I have asked one of our students, Tom Goodsir, to undertake a literature survey on James's moral philosophy, and since he did such an excellent job with it, it would be a shame not to share it, so that's what (with Tom's permission) I'm now doing. What follows is all Tom's work.
The Moral Philosophy of William James
Literature Review
Tom Goodsir
Overview
The literature on James’s moral views is largely confined to
chapters in larger works, and much of the analysis at present is explanatory and intended
for a more generally inquisitive reader who is interested in a broad picture of
James’s views. Two important texts are Franzese’s Ethics
of Energy and Gale’s The Divided Self.
Both of these are primarily concerned with systematising and exploring James’s moral
views and although both treatments seem to overlap in a variety of areas, Franzese’s
Ethics is premised on a specific, non-utilitarian reading of the “Moral Philosopher”.
Gale’s specific focus is on accounting for the philosophical subject in James, and from
here he derives an account
of James’s morality.
As of yet, there is no systematic treatment of James’s moral
thinking per-se, although Perry’s classic text treats James as a moralist, and this
interpretation has been followed - although not always with much thought - by a number of
scholars. I have listed below a number of works not specifically on James (such as Misak’s)
but that provide interesting and alternative perspectives on some of James’s thinking.
Particularly Goodman’s characterization of James as a kind of romantic is
particularly nice, and it seems to fit well with what one can read into “On a Certain Blindness”.
One particular discrepancy which seems to occur commonly in
the literature is the relationship (or the distinction) between morality and
ethics. It is not clear (at least to me!) that James makes any such distinction and it does not
appear to fit neatly into James’s wider pragmatism. Scholars tend to use the two terms
quite indiscriminately and some sharpening on James’s thought here is required. In terms of journal articles, much of the discussion on
James’s moral or ethical thinking is confined to the proceedings of the Charles Peirce Society
and there is a limited amount of really contemporary scholarship on the subject.
Primary Texts
The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life
James’s most explicit treatment of the subject of morality.
Most importantly here, he develops a critical principle of his ethical philosophy,
that we should “satisfy at all times as many demands as we can” (WB, 205).
James, W., “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” in The Will to Believe and Other
Essays in Popular
Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979
The Will to Believe
James’s discussion of the possibility of holding a belief
without first holding prior evidence. Important in determining how we come to formulate
ethical and moral beliefs.
James, W., The Will to
Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, Cambridge, MA
and London: Harvard University Press, 1979; first published
in 1897.
On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings
Interesting (if fleeting) treatment of morality. I think
this points to two important thoughts. Firstly, he argues we are “afflicted” with a
blindness towards the views of others, and naturally self-concerned. From my reading, this
stands both as a rejection of any notion of duty or obligation towards others, but also
imposes the idea of a plurality of moral views which we ought to recognize on the grounds
that the feelings of others are no less important than our own feelings.
Secondly, he continues this thought, citing Wordsworth, who
argues natural things have “limitless significance”, and may as such be attributed a
“moral life”. For James, there is no reason that ‘morality’ has to refer explicitly to action
between humans but should also concern our natural environment. Again, he seems eager not
to prioritise human feeling over animal or natural feeling.
James, W “On a Certain Blindness” in Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some
of Life's Ideals.
New York: Henry Holt, 1899
The Letters of William James
Many of James’s letters concern the subject of morality, and
his use is often curious. He refers frequently to the ‘moral’ characters of a country or
an individual (see letters to H.G. Wells, 1906, Bill James, 1907 and François Pillon
1898). James also refers also to his own moral state (“I am better both physically and
morally than I have been in four years”) in a letter to Mrs. Henry Whitman, 1903.
It would imply from this usage that James takes morality as
applicable only to a particular (not necessarily human) subject. He explicitly rejects
notions of morality which rely upon “invisible, molecular moral forces that work from individual
to individual”, again in correspondence with Mrs Whitman in 1898.
I have also explored an early unpublished letter from James
to William Darwin on the subject of morality. This is now published in a paper by
Ignas Skrupskelis: see below.
James, W., The Letters
of William James, Boston: Little Brown, 1926
Secondary Literature
Books
Misak, C., The
American Pragmatists, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013
General but persuasive chapter on James, with a short but
considerable treatment of the relationship between MP and WB (see p65-76).
Pawelski, J., The
Dynamic Individualism of William James, New York: SUNY Press, 2012.
Important discussion on what Pawelski calls James’s moral
choice to invoke free will (p56 onwards) and direct criticism of Gale’s view in the
‘Divided Self’ (see p99). Recent summation of much past scholarship.
Gavin, W., William
James in Focus, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013
Interesting perspective on our obligation to be moral,
according to James – links to discussion of the time constraints faced when making
decisions and James’s rejection of moral scepticism in MP.
Bernstein, R., The
Pragmatic Turn, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010
Bernstein dedicates a chapter to the “Ethical Implications
of William James’s Pragmatic Pluralism”. I am not convinced that the traditional
distinction between ethics and morality holds up in James’s case, and this may be something
worth exploring.
Slater, M., William
James on Ethics and Faith, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009
Slater’s theological treatment focuses heavily on the
relationship between James’s ethics and his religious thought. Slater argues that James has a
series of ‘moral arguments’ for faith, which seems counterintuitive but I think is
ultimately well argued.
Franzese, S., The
Ethics of Energy: William James's Moral Philosophy in Focus, Berlin: Walter
de
Gruyter, 2008
Comprehensive treatment of James’s moral philosophy, with a
particular focus on the Kantian idea of moral effort. Franzese believes that it is
incorrect to interpret James as a version of a utilitarian (as many have) and bases his efforts
on this misunderstanding.
Richardson, R., William
James: In the Malestrom of American Modernity, Boston: Hardcourt,
2007.
In his biography of James, Richardson draws out the lineage
between James’s psychology and his moral philosophy. He argues (p309 onwards) that
James’s morality (and his rejection of deontological morality) is grounded in an
almost utilitarian acknowledgement of the existence of desires.
Gale, Richard M., The
Divided Self of William James, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999
This work gives a comprehensive treatment of James’s moral
thinking over around 100 pages. Gale gives a good exposition of James’s rejection of
moral truths and the distinction between James’s ethics and morality before
drawing the link to his religious views.
Perry, R., The
Thought and Character of William James, Nashville: Vanderbilt University
Press, 1935
Although this work is old, this appears to be a classic
account of James as a moralist and Perry’s discussion of James’s moral individualism is good.
This theme is picked up on and developed by James Campbell (see below).
Cotkin, G., William
James: Public Philosopher, Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1994
Cotkin touches on numerous areas of James’s morality and its
linkage with religion. Of particular interest are his arguments against determinism
(pp. 83-94) and the link with what Cotkin calls James’s ‘discourse of heroism’. For
Cotkin, the heroic man or woman is a moral man or woman.
Goodman, R., American
Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990
Goodman argues that James relies heavily on our romantic
sentiments (our passions) when we ascribe a moral nature or character to things and
when we make moral decisions. He cites James’s arguments from MP (see p81).
Myers, G., William
James: His Life and Thought, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.
Myers dedicates an introductory chapter to James’s ‘moral
thought’. He leans heavily on many of the moral intuitions James developed as a young boy
to explain his ongoing concern for morality, even though his pragmatism seemed to
disavow it. This contradiction between James’s desire to invent moral
principles and his pragmatism seems of great importance.
Fernstein, H., Becoming
William James, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984
Passages on how the interaction between religion and
morality developed in James’s work, particularly with reference to the work of his brother
and father (p84). Again, Fernstein brings out this apparent struggle between James’s
desire to have a moral philosophy within a framework which seems not to allow one.
Wilshire, B.,
William James and Phenomenology, New York: AMS Press, 1979.
Alternative perspective on James’s metaphysics, worthy of
consideration as it adds weight to the thesis that James is not seeking a ‘morality’
in the Kantian sense, but is trying to forge a gap between traditional philosophical
categories. Many of these ideas resurface in Benoist’s article (see below).
Journal Articles
Putnam, H, “The Ideas of William James” in Raritan, New Brunswick, NJ, Winter 1989,
pp.17-44
Putnam seeks to give an account of James “first and
foremost” as a moral philosopher. Analysis of James’s ‘utilitarian’ viewpoint and his
distinction between moral and scientific truths (p25).
Benoist, J, “Phenomenology or Pragmatism” in Pragmatism: Critical Concepts in Philosophy,
ed. Russell Goodman, London: Taylor and Francis, 2005.
Not strictly on James’s moral thought, but an interesting
and alternative perspective that links James with Husserl. This is particularly important
from the perspective of thinking who the moral subject might be in James’s philosophy.
Koutstaal, W., “Lowly Notions: Forgetting in William
James's Moral Universe”, Transactions
of the Charles S.
Peirce Society, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Fall, 1993), pp. 609-635
Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320441
Interesting account of James’s idea of a ‘moral holiday’.
Also the idea that we can forge a middle way between traditional rationalist and empiricist
notions of morality.
Skrupskelis, I., “Evolution and Pragmatism: An
Unpublished Letter of William James”,
Transactions of the
Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Fall, 2007), pp. 745-752
Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40321224
(I think) a critical discovery of a very interesting letter
addressed to William Darwin (son of Charles) in which James goes into depth on his early
moral ideas. Very important in showing development of James’s ideas from his younger days.
Smith, A., “William James and the Politics of Moral
Conflict”, Transactions of the Charles S.
Peirce Society,
Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter, 2004), pp. 135-151
Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320978
Discussion of James’s ‘political thought’. This is more
focused on James’s discussion of the right (ethical) action in a particular circumstance, but
may be useful in drawing out James’s moral views.
Genter, R., “Of Mystics and Lighthouse Keepers: The Moral
Visions of William James
and Josiah Royce”, History
of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 87-108
Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27744909
Genter sets James’s pluralism in contrast to Royce, and
gives an interesting account of James’s relation between theory and practice – or rather
James’s preference to think in terms of practice.
Campbell, J., “William James and the Ethics of
Fulfillment”, Transactions of the Charles
S.
Peirce Society,
Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer, 1981), pp. 224-240
Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40319924
Campbell explicitly explores James’s ethics with a view to
drawing broader conclusions about his views on morality and morality in general.
Boyle, D., “William James's Ethical Symphony”, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce
Society, Vol.
34, No. 4 (Fall, 1998), pp. 977-1003
Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320736
Detailed textual analysis of MP in which Boyle interprets
James’s maxim that we should satisfy as many demands as we can as a utilitarian idea, but
a qualitative one in which the greatest (most pressing?) demands should be satisfied,
rather than the largest quantity of demands.
Pihlström, S., “William James on Death, Mortality, and
Immortality”, Transactions of the
Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Fall, 2002),
pp. 605-628
Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320916
Brief introduction on the nature of James’s morality in
which Pihlström (following Cotkin) emphasizes the need for an ethical hero. Pihlström
also attempts to place ethics as prior to James’s metaphysics.
Putnam, H., and Putnam, R.A., “The Real William James:
Response to Robert Meyers”,
Transactions of the
Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Spring, 1998), pp.
366-381
Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320699
The Putnams take on Meyer’s characterization of James as an
‘anything goes’ pluralist in the Cambridge Companion. There is some dispute between these
scholars as to an interpretation of the first line of MP.
Kauber, P., “The Foundations of James's Ethics of Belief”,
Ethics, Vol. 84, No. 2 (Jan.,
1974), pp. 151-166
Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380112
Kauber attempts to trace James’s ‘mature’ ethical thinking
in WB to his earlier work, enquiring particularly into the problem of where our ethical
(moral?) beliefs originate.
Other Journal Articles
Aiken, H., “William James as Moral and Social Philosopher”, Philosophic Exchange 3 (1981):
55-68.
Putnam, R.A., “William James and Moral Objectivity”, William James Studies, 1.1 (2007).
Putnam, R.A., “The Moral Life of a Pragmatist”, Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays
in
Moral Psychology
(1990): 67-89.
Perrin, J., “The Incoherence of William James’ Moral
Philosophy”, Aporia vol. 21 no. 2
(2011)
11-17.
A
couple of weeks ago I attended a conference on posthuman politics in Mytilene
(Greece). It was dominated by critical posthumanists (with a few transhumanists
thrown in for good measure), most of whom seemed to be convinced that “humanism”
and “dualism” were brought into the world by the devil (or, which is more or
less the same, dead white males) to make life hard for oppressed minorities
(i.e. people with the wrong skin colour, gender, sexual orientation, or species
membership). Some presenters suggested that we seek guidance from Buddhism or “spiritualism”
(teaching us the all-oneness of all things etc.) to overcome the dominant
worldview. Towards the end of the conference I was so thoroughly fed up with
the consistent and never really questioned damnation of dualism-and-humanism,
which was believed to dominate Western philosophy and thinking (and hence
politics) in general and to be the root of all evil, that I could no longer
contain myself. After a the final presentation (in which Stefan Sorgner very
originally managed to utilize the shared anti-dualist stance in support of his not
very original argument for the ethical equivalence of traditional education and
genetic cognitive enhancement, thus bridging the gap between posthumanism and
transhumanism), I committed unspeakable sacrilege by asking what was actually
wrong with dualism. My question remained unanswered. Apparently it was too
obvious what was wrong with it to merit any explanation. 
Anyway,
after the discussion (which focussed on other issues) was over, I was
approached by the Spanish artist and self-declared meta-humanist Jaime de Val,
who essentially accused me of being an undercover agent of the establishment,
hell-bent to destroy the tender plant of metahumanism (or posthumanism, or
whatever). By questioning the validity of the habitual anti-dualist stance I
had revealed myself as the enemy of the people, and it was made very clear to
me that I didn’t have any business being at that conference in the first place
and that it would be very much appreciated if I didn’t show my face again (that
is, at similar events planned for the future). When I tried to direct the argument
away from the personal and back to the issue of dualism, I suddenly found
myself debating the question whether men and women actually exist, which I had,
rather naively, proposed as an example of a duality (one of many) that actually
existed. It seemed to me that the existence of men and women was undeniable,
but I could probably not have picked a worse example, judging by the wrath that
the example provoked in my opponent. I was brusquely told that men and women
did not exist and that the fact that I did believe in their existence just
demonstrated the depth of my ignorance. 
I
can assure you I’m not blind to the fact that many of the differences that we see
between the sexes are socially constructed. My point is not that there is still
a biological foundation to the distinction between male and female (although I
find it hard to understand how that can be denied), but rather that socially
constructed differences are as real for us as biological differences. The distinction
is not so much ontological as experiential. In our life-world, in the way we
experience the world, men and women undoubtedly exist. And so do animals and
machines, subjects and objects, the self and the other, the human and the
non-human, the living and the dead, adults and children. Those differences are
real. It may be theoretically possible to structure the world differently, to
pay more attention to other differences and less to these, but it is very hard
to actually live by an alternative (non-dualistic) ontology. Even posthumanists
act like humanists most of the time, simply because it would be very difficult
not to. You may fervently deny that there is any relevant difference between
human agency and the agency of things, but you will probably not try to
convince your furniture of this. Instead you will give a talk at an academic
conference, where you will talk to other humans, who will politely listen to
you, one human (in most cases male or female) subject talking to other (again
mostly male or female) human subjects. Inanimate objects and animals (several
cats and dogs who appeared to be living in the university buildings) were
ignored, on solid humanist grounds. And during the breaks people visited the
toilets. There were two kinds, one for women and one for men, which I’m sure is
very oppressive, but it actually worked. Nobody seemed to be confused by it. I
wonder why that is. 
