The Moral Philosophy of William James: an Annotated Bibliography

I have always been interested in the philosophy of William James, especially his moral philosophy, which little is ever heard of. Over the years I have written a couple of papers in which I explore or make use of James's ethics ("Foolish Little Children in the Eyes of Reason" and "Believing in the Dignity of Human Embryos"), but nothing approaching a systematic account and appraisal of it. This year I'm going to teach, for the first time, an undergraduate seminar on James's Pragmatism, which I'm hoping will prove a useful starting point for a more extensive engagement with his work. Preparing for this, I have asked one of our students, Tom Goodsir, to undertake a literature survey on James's moral philosophy, and since he did such an excellent job with it, it would be a shame not to share it, so that's what (with Tom's permission) I'm now doing. What follows is all Tom's work.

The Moral Philosophy of William James

Literature Review

Tom Goodsir

Overview

The literature on James’s moral views is largely confined to chapters in larger works, and much of the analysis at present is explanatory and intended for a more generally inquisitive reader who is interested in a broad picture of James’s views. Two important texts are Franzese’s Ethics of Energy and Gale’s The Divided Self. Both of these are primarily concerned with systematising and exploring James’s moral views and although both treatments seem to overlap in a variety of areas, Franzese’s Ethics is premised on a specific, non-utilitarian reading of the “Moral Philosopher”. Gale’s specific focus is on accounting for the philosophical subject in James, and from here he derives an account

of James’s morality.

As of yet, there is no systematic treatment of James’s moral thinking per-se, although Perry’s classic text treats James as a moralist, and this interpretation has been followed - although not always with much thought - by a number of scholars. I have listed below a number of works not specifically on James (such as Misak’s) but that provide interesting and alternative perspectives on some of James’s thinking. Particularly Goodman’s characterization of James as a kind of romantic is particularly nice, and it seems to fit well with what one can read into “On a Certain Blindness”.

One particular discrepancy which seems to occur commonly in the literature is the relationship (or the distinction) between morality and ethics. It is not clear (at least to me!) that James makes any such distinction and it does not appear to fit neatly into James’s wider pragmatism. Scholars tend to use the two terms quite indiscriminately and some sharpening on James’s thought here is required. In terms of journal articles, much of the discussion on James’s moral or ethical thinking is confined to the proceedings of the Charles Peirce Society and there is a limited amount of really contemporary scholarship on the subject.

Primary Texts

The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life

James’s most explicit treatment of the subject of morality. Most importantly here, he develops a critical principle of his ethical philosophy, that we should “satisfy at all times as many demands as we can” (WB, 205).

James, W., “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” in The Will to Believe and Other

Essays in Popular Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979

The Will to Believe

James’s discussion of the possibility of holding a belief without first holding prior evidence. Important in determining how we come to formulate ethical and moral beliefs.

James, W., The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, Cambridge, MA

and London: Harvard University Press, 1979; first published in 1897.

On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings

Interesting (if fleeting) treatment of morality. I think this points to two important thoughts. Firstly, he argues we are “afflicted” with a blindness towards the views of others, and naturally self-concerned. From my reading, this stands both as a rejection of any notion of duty or obligation towards others, but also imposes the idea of a plurality of moral views which we ought to recognize on the grounds that the feelings of others are no less important than our own feelings.

Secondly, he continues this thought, citing Wordsworth, who argues natural things have “limitless significance”, and may as such be attributed a “moral life”. For James, there is no reason that ‘morality’ has to refer explicitly to action between humans but should also concern our natural environment. Again, he seems eager not to prioritise human feeling over animal or natural feeling.

James, W “On a Certain Blindness” in Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some

of Life's Ideals. New York: Henry Holt, 1899

The Letters of William James

Many of James’s letters concern the subject of morality, and his use is often curious. He refers frequently to the ‘moral’ characters of a country or an individual (see letters to H.G. Wells, 1906, Bill James, 1907 and François Pillon 1898). James also refers also to his own moral state (“I am better both physically and morally than I have been in four years”) in a letter to Mrs. Henry Whitman, 1903.

It would imply from this usage that James takes morality as applicable only to a particular (not necessarily human) subject. He explicitly rejects notions of morality which rely upon “invisible, molecular moral forces that work from individual to individual”, again in correspondence with Mrs Whitman in 1898.

I have also explored an early unpublished letter from James to William Darwin on the subject of morality. This is now published in a paper by Ignas Skrupskelis: see below.

James, W., The Letters of William James, Boston: Little Brown, 1926

Secondary Literature

Books

Misak, C., The American Pragmatists, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013

General but persuasive chapter on James, with a short but considerable treatment of the relationship between MP and WB (see p65-76).

Pawelski, J., The Dynamic Individualism of William James, New York: SUNY Press, 2012.

Important discussion on what Pawelski calls James’s moral choice to invoke free will (p56 onwards) and direct criticism of Gale’s view in the ‘Divided Self’ (see p99). Recent summation of much past scholarship.

Gavin, W., William James in Focus, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013

Interesting perspective on our obligation to be moral, according to James – links to discussion of the time constraints faced when making decisions and James’s rejection of moral scepticism in MP.

Bernstein, R., The Pragmatic Turn, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010

Bernstein dedicates a chapter to the “Ethical Implications of William James’s Pragmatic Pluralism”. I am not convinced that the traditional distinction between ethics and morality holds up in James’s case, and this may be something worth exploring.

Slater, M., William James on Ethics and Faith, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009

Slater’s theological treatment focuses heavily on the relationship between James’s ethics and his religious thought. Slater argues that James has a series of ‘moral arguments’ for faith, which seems counterintuitive but I think is ultimately well argued.

Franzese, S., The Ethics of Energy: William James's Moral Philosophy in Focus, Berlin: Walter de

Gruyter, 2008

Comprehensive treatment of James’s moral philosophy, with a particular focus on the Kantian idea of moral effort. Franzese believes that it is incorrect to interpret James as a version of a utilitarian (as many have) and bases his efforts on this misunderstanding.

Richardson, R., William James: In the Malestrom of American Modernity, Boston: Hardcourt,

2007.

In his biography of James, Richardson draws out the lineage between James’s psychology and his moral philosophy. He argues (p309 onwards) that James’s morality (and his rejection of deontological morality) is grounded in an almost utilitarian acknowledgement of the existence of desires.

Gale, Richard M., The Divided Self of William James, Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1999

This work gives a comprehensive treatment of James’s moral thinking over around 100 pages. Gale gives a good exposition of James’s rejection of moral truths and the distinction between James’s ethics and morality before drawing the link to his religious views.

Perry, R., The Thought and Character of William James, Nashville: Vanderbilt University

Press, 1935

Although this work is old, this appears to be a classic account of James as a moralist and Perry’s discussion of James’s moral individualism is good. This theme is picked up on and developed by James Campbell (see below).

Cotkin, G., William James: Public Philosopher, Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1994

Cotkin touches on numerous areas of James’s morality and its linkage with religion. Of particular interest are his arguments against determinism (pp. 83-94) and the link with what Cotkin calls James’s ‘discourse of heroism’. For Cotkin, the heroic man or woman is a moral man or woman.

Goodman, R., American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1990

Goodman argues that James relies heavily on our romantic sentiments (our passions) when we ascribe a moral nature or character to things and when we make moral decisions. He cites James’s arguments from MP (see p81).

Myers, G., William James: His Life and Thought, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.

Myers dedicates an introductory chapter to James’s ‘moral thought’. He leans heavily on many of the moral intuitions James developed as a young boy to explain his ongoing concern for morality, even though his pragmatism seemed to disavow it. This contradiction between James’s desire to invent moral principles and his pragmatism seems of great importance.

Fernstein, H., Becoming William James, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984

Passages on how the interaction between religion and morality developed in James’s work, particularly with reference to the work of his brother and father (p84). Again, Fernstein brings out this apparent struggle between James’s desire to have a moral philosophy within a framework which seems not to allow one.

Wilshire, B., William James and Phenomenology, New York: AMS Press, 1979.

Alternative perspective on James’s metaphysics, worthy of consideration as it adds weight to the thesis that James is not seeking a ‘morality’ in the Kantian sense, but is trying to forge a gap between traditional philosophical categories. Many of these ideas resurface in Benoist’s article (see below).

Journal Articles

Putnam, H, “The Ideas of William James” in Raritan, New Brunswick, NJ, Winter 1989,

pp.17-44

Putnam seeks to give an account of James “first and foremost” as a moral philosopher. Analysis of James’s ‘utilitarian’ viewpoint and his distinction between moral and scientific truths (p25).

Benoist, J, “Phenomenology or Pragmatism” in Pragmatism: Critical Concepts in Philosophy,

ed. Russell Goodman, London: Taylor and Francis, 2005.

Not strictly on James’s moral thought, but an interesting and alternative perspective that links James with Husserl. This is particularly important from the perspective of thinking who the moral subject might be in James’s philosophy.

Koutstaal, W., “Lowly Notions: Forgetting in William James's Moral Universe”, Transactions

of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Fall, 1993), pp. 609-635

Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320441

Interesting account of James’s idea of a ‘moral holiday’. Also the idea that we can forge a middle way between traditional rationalist and empiricist notions of morality.

Skrupskelis, I., “Evolution and Pragmatism: An Unpublished Letter of William James”,

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Fall, 2007), pp. 745-752

Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40321224

(I think) a critical discovery of a very interesting letter addressed to William Darwin (son of Charles) in which James goes into depth on his early moral ideas. Very important in showing development of James’s ideas from his younger days.

Smith, A., “William James and the Politics of Moral Conflict”, Transactions of the Charles S.

Peirce Society, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter, 2004), pp. 135-151

Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320978

Discussion of James’s ‘political thought’. This is more focused on James’s discussion of the right (ethical) action in a particular circumstance, but may be useful in drawing out James’s moral views.

Genter, R., “Of Mystics and Lighthouse Keepers: The Moral Visions of William James

and Josiah Royce”, History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 87-108

Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27744909

Genter sets James’s pluralism in contrast to Royce, and gives an interesting account of James’s relation between theory and practice – or rather James’s preference to think in terms of practice.

Campbell, J., “William James and the Ethics of Fulfillment”, Transactions of the Charles S.

Peirce Society, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer, 1981), pp. 224-240

Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40319924

Campbell explicitly explores James’s ethics with a view to drawing broader conclusions about his views on morality and morality in general.

Boyle, D., “William James's Ethical Symphony”, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol.

34, No. 4 (Fall, 1998), pp. 977-1003

Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320736

Detailed textual analysis of MP in which Boyle interprets James’s maxim that we should satisfy as many demands as we can as a utilitarian idea, but a qualitative one in which the greatest (most pressing?) demands should be satisfied, rather than the largest quantity of demands.

Pihlström, S., “William James on Death, Mortality, and Immortality”, Transactions of the

Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Fall, 2002), pp. 605-628

Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320916

Brief introduction on the nature of James’s morality in which Pihlström (following Cotkin) emphasizes the need for an ethical hero. Pihlström also attempts to place ethics as prior to James’s metaphysics.

Putnam, H., and Putnam, R.A., “The Real William James: Response to Robert Meyers”,

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Spring, 1998), pp. 366-381

Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320699

The Putnams take on Meyer’s characterization of James as an ‘anything goes’ pluralist in the Cambridge Companion. There is some dispute between these scholars as to an interpretation of the first line of MP.

Kauber, P., “The Foundations of James's Ethics of Belief”, Ethics, Vol. 84, No. 2 (Jan.,

1974), pp. 151-166

Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380112

Kauber attempts to trace James’s ‘mature’ ethical thinking in WB to his earlier work, enquiring particularly into the problem of where our ethical (moral?) beliefs originate. 

Other Journal Articles

Aiken, H., “William James as Moral and Social Philosopher”, Philosophic Exchange 3 (1981):

55-68.

Putnam, R.A., “William James and Moral Objectivity”, William James Studies, 1.1 (2007).

Putnam, R.A., “The Moral Life of a Pragmatist”, Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in

Moral Psychology (1990): 67-89.

Perrin, J., “The Incoherence of William James’ Moral Philosophy”, Aporia vol. 21 no. 2 (2011)

11-17.

Do Automatic Sweethearts Work?

A couple of weeks ago I briefly discussed, prompted by David Levy’s treatment of the issue in his book Love and Sex with Robots, whether a robot can be said to love a person if they say they do and act as if they did. Today I’d like to continue this discussion.

In his 1909 book The Meaning of Truth, the great William James asserts that a statement is only meaningful if it makes a practical difference whether or not it is true: “if it can make no practical difference whether a given statement be true or false, then the statement has no real meaning.” (p. 52) However, in a footnote later in the same book (p. 189), he corrects a claim that he made in his previous book, Pragmatism, where he declared the terms ‘God’ and ‘matter’ for synonymous “so long as no differing future consequences were deducible from the two conceptions”. Now, however, he no longer believes this, because even if the godless universe were exactly like one in which God does exist, believing the one or the other would definitely make a difference for us. “Even if matter could do every outward thing that God does, the idea of it would not work as satisfactorily, because the chief call for a God on modern man’s part is for a being who will inwardly recognise them and judge them sympathetically.” James then asks us to consider an analogy which he thinks will convince us that there is indeed a relevant, meaningful difference between the two hypotheses:

“The flaw was evident when, as a case analogous to that of a godless universe, I thought of what I called an ‘automatic sweetheart,’ meaning a soulless body which should be absolutely indistinguishable from a spiritually animated maiden, laughing, talking, blushing, nursing us, and performing all feminine offices as tactfully and sweetly as if a soul were in her. Would any one regard her as a full equivalent? Certainly not, and why? Because, framed as we are, our egoism craves above all things inward sympathy and recognition, love and admiration. The outward treatment is valued mainly as an expression, as a manifestation of the accompanying consciousness believed in. Pragmatically, then, belief in the automatic sweetheart would not work, and in point of fact no one treats is as a serious hypothesis.”

Yet just a year later, in December 1910, the philosopher Edgar Arthur Singer gave an address before the American Philosophical Association at Princeton, entitled “Mind as an Observable Object” (later published as the first chapter of his 1924 book Mind as Behavior), in which he directly attacks James for his alleged inconsistency. Pragmatically, a soulless person (that is, one that lacks subjectivity and any form of mental awareness) should be regarded as fully equivalent to the usual kind, to a person with a soul. Singer insists that it would not make any difference whatsoever whether the other really feels anything at all or just behaves in a way that is consistent with real feelings, that is, in such a way that we cannot detect any difference between what they do and what a real, conscious and self-aware person would do. Thus, contrary to what James suggests, for all intents and purposes an automatic sweetheart is just as good as a real human lover.

When we occasionally call a lover “soulless”, we do, according to Singer, in fact refer to a certain (already observed or predicted) behaviour, so if there is a difference between the soulful and the soulless it is a difference in behaviour: “If I imagine myself come to believe that my mistress, with all her loveliness, is really without soul, I cannot think what I should mean by this if it be not that I fear her future conduct will not bear out my expectations regarding her. Some trait or gesture, a mere tightening of the lips, hardening of the eye, stifling of a yawn, one of those things we say are rather felt than seen, would have raised in my mind the suspicion that she might not to my fuller experience of her remain indistinguishable from a spiritually minded maiden.” If the distinction between ‘soulless’ and ‘soulful’ means anything, then it is this. “Consciousness is not something inferred from behavior; it is behavior.”

James’s point, of course, was that we wouldn’t be happy with a lover of whom we knew that they didn’t really feel anything for us and that all their seemingly loving actions deceive us to the extent that they indicate some kind of emotional involvement on the part of our lover. Yet Singer could respond that we might well be unhappy with an automatic sweetheart, but that we really shouldn’t be because to react like that is completely irrational, given that a real human lover would do nothing different from the automatic one.

It is interesting, though, to see how neatly Singer’s description of a “soulless” lover (where the term can be meaningfully ascribed) fits with the descriptions that we find in literature of equally unsatisfying women and with the accompanying eulogies on the virtues of the artificial lover (as, for example, in Ovid’s Pygmalion, Hoffmann’s The Sandman, or Villiers’ The Future Eve). Once again, it is the real human lover who is decried as soulless, the one that turns out not to be completely reliable, completely with us, completely there for us. It is the yawn that indicates the lack of soul, a less than interested gaze. That is the danger that always exists when we risk getting involved with real human beings. They might lose interest in us, might grow cold and unresponsive, might stop loving us. If that is an indicator of soullessness, then each and every one of us is soulless, and only an automatic sweetheart, one whose eyes will always gaze lovingly at us and will never lose their shine, whose lips never tighten, but are always soft and welcoming, and who will never have to stifle a yawn, only such a one can be said to have a soul.

Thus it appears that the effect of denying that there is any difference between a real person and a fake person, between a real human lover and an automatic sweetheart, is that the soulless becomes, or comes to be regarded as, the truly soulful, and the soulful the truly soulless.

William James on the Sacredness of Matter

Browsing through my collection of William James’s books in order to find a particular quote, I stumbled upon the following passage, which I marked a long time ago, but had forgotten about, and which might serve as a postscript to my previous post on Thomas Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos. The passage is from Pragmatism (Longmans, Green, and Co. 1907), p. 95:

“To any one who has ever looked on the face of a dead child or parent the mere fact that matter could have taken for a time that precious form, ought to make matter sacred ever after. It makes no difference what the principle of life may be, material or immaterial, matter at any rate cooperates, lends itself to all life’s purposes. That beloved incarnation was among matter’s possibilities.”

Automatic Sweethearts for Transhumanists: Sexbots on the Rise

More than a hundred years ago, the American philosopher and ur-psychologist William James once briefly discussed, in one of the footnotes to his book Pragmatism, the possibility and desirability of a sexual companion that acted exactly like a real human lover would, but that did not feel anything at all. James called this fantasy an "automatic sweetheart". Philosophers of mind would later, dropping the erotic connotations, speak of a "philosophical zombie".

Today, it seems, automatic sweethearts have already become a reality. They are called sex robots or simply "sexbots". You can buy them on the internet (www.sexbots.us, which I first misread as Sexbots R Us), the basic, "unmotorized" version for  6,000 USD (plus shipping and handling) and the advanced version ("self-contained, rechargeable and touch activated") for 11,299 USD. Tough choice, but at least you can try them before you buy, that is, rent them first to make sure it's the right thing for you. What you are being promised is a "life-like sexual companion" with "life-like movements" and a removable (for easier cleaning) skin with "natural flesh-like feel" who is designed "with the movements needed to perform sexual acts" so it can "actually do the job". However, what you really get, judging from the pictures and short videos in which you can see the bots in action, is an (either male or female) giant Barbie Doll, fresh from the Uncanny Valley. There's even a short video where you can watch Ken and Barbie having sex, which is about as arousing as watching two coupling ladybirds. Honestly, I would much rather use my hand than do it with one of those bots.

But then, I'm not a transhumanist. If I were one I would be obliged to celebrate the rise of the sexbots as another victory in our brave struggle against nature and against nasty bioluddites. Last month the Centre for Transhumanity republished on their website transhumanity.net an article by a certain Hank Pellisier entitled "Sexbots Will Give Us Longevity Orgasms". The same article had already been published three years earlier in the magazine of the World Transhumanist Association humanity plus (when the author still called himself "Hank Hyena", which is probably the worst pseudonym in the history of pseudonyms). The images show two sparsely clad and certainly very enticing young women who supposedly are meant to be taken for paradigmatic sexbots (and who look nothing like the real ones of the Ken & Barbie type). The article begins by informing us that sex is good for us, the more and the more explosive, the better. But that means that we hardly ever get enough of it. Real human companions tend to have the occasional headache or their period or have to work or what have you, so twice a day is out of the question, and after a while the sex you get is not even particularly good, which is really bad for your mental and physical health. Enter the sexbots, which are exactly the kind of sexual partner that we always wanted, only much, much better, like just about everything in the technologically enchanted posthuman world that transhumanists are so fond of salivating over. You like sex? You ain't seen nothing yet. By the year 2050

"sexbots will electrocute our flesh with climaxes thrice as gigantic because they’ll be more desirable, patient, eager, and altruistic than their meat-bag competition, plus they’ll be uploaded with supreme sex-skills from millennia of erotic manuals, archives and academic experiments, and their anatomy will feature sexplosive devices. Sexbots will heighten our ecstasy until we have shrieking, frothy, bug-eyed, amnesia-inducing orgasms. They’ll offer us quadruple-tongued cunnilingus, open-throat silky fellatio, deliriously gentle kissing, transcendent nipple tweaking, g-spot massage & prostate milking dexterity, plus 2,000 varieties of coital rhythm with scented lubes — this will all be ours when the Sexbots arrive."

Wow, I can't wait. The guy is not joking, by the way. He seems to really mean it. Finally we're going to get the kind of sex that we deserve. Life will be as it should have been all along. And it's so healthy and can easily add several years to your life. And it's so much easier. No more foreplay, no more boring conversations, no commitment or obligations, no embarrassing questions, no talking back. Perfect!

"Sexbots will never have headaches, fatigue, impotence, premature ejaculation, pubic lice, disinterest, menstrual blood, jock strap itch, yeast infections, genital warts, AIDS/HIV, herpes, silly expectations, or inhibiting phobias. Sexbots will never stalk us, rape us, diss us on their blog, weep when we dump them, or tell their friends we were boring in bed."

Hyena/ Pellisier further predicts that sexbots will come with an option: eye contact or no eye contact. And they will shower after we have used them "and put themselves back in the closet." So convenient.

So sexbots are really good for us on so many levels. Life extension, the holy grail of transhumanism. Well-being and happiness for everyone, at any time, the hedonistic imperative. And of course control, independence, autonomy. Nature finally defeated. We don't need anyone, and we are not needed by anyone. (Human lovers are much too needy. We don't need that.) Sexbots make us free. We can finally take without having to give anything back. We don't have to worry about what they feel. They never disobey. We can just use them. Humans like to see themselves as ends and tend to resent being treated as a mere means. Sexbots won't object. They are means.