A
couple of weeks ago I attended a conference on posthuman politics in Mytilene
(Greece). It was dominated by critical posthumanists (with a few transhumanists
thrown in for good measure), most of whom seemed to be convinced that “humanism”
and “dualism” were brought into the world by the devil (or, which is more or
less the same, dead white males) to make life hard for oppressed minorities
(i.e. people with the wrong skin colour, gender, sexual orientation, or species
membership). Some presenters suggested that we seek guidance from Buddhism or “spiritualism”
(teaching us the all-oneness of all things etc.) to overcome the dominant
worldview. Towards the end of the conference I was so thoroughly fed up with
the consistent and never really questioned damnation of dualism-and-humanism,
which was believed to dominate Western philosophy and thinking (and hence
politics) in general and to be the root of all evil, that I could no longer
contain myself. After a the final presentation (in which Stefan Sorgner very
originally managed to utilize the shared anti-dualist stance in support of his not
very original argument for the ethical equivalence of traditional education and
genetic cognitive enhancement, thus bridging the gap between posthumanism and
transhumanism), I committed unspeakable sacrilege by asking what was actually
wrong with dualism. My question remained unanswered. Apparently it was too
obvious what was wrong with it to merit any explanation.
Of
course, Cartesian substance dualism is very implausible, but is there anyone
out there who still believes in it? Today? The same holds for humanism, or
Humanism, with a capital H. Very few, at least in Western Europe, still believe
that humans have been created in the image of God, or something like that, elevated
and positioned above all other living creatures, to rule the earth and
everything that lives on it. But it is hard to deny that there are differences
between humans and other animals. How categorical they are, and how relevant,
is of course a different question.
Anyway,
after the discussion (which focussed on other issues) was over, I was
approached by the Spanish artist and self-declared meta-humanist Jaime de Val,
who essentially accused me of being an undercover agent of the establishment,
hell-bent to destroy the tender plant of metahumanism (or posthumanism, or
whatever). By questioning the validity of the habitual anti-dualist stance I
had revealed myself as the enemy of the people, and it was made very clear to
me that I didn’t have any business being at that conference in the first place
and that it would be very much appreciated if I didn’t show my face again (that
is, at similar events planned for the future). When I tried to direct the argument
away from the personal and back to the issue of dualism, I suddenly found
myself debating the question whether men and women actually exist, which I had,
rather naively, proposed as an example of a duality (one of many) that actually
existed. It seemed to me that the existence of men and women was undeniable,
but I could probably not have picked a worse example, judging by the wrath that
the example provoked in my opponent. I was brusquely told that men and women
did not exist and that the fact that I did believe in their existence just
demonstrated the depth of my ignorance.
Unfortunately
I didn’t learn much more than that, so I don’t really know why de Val thought
men and women did not exist and what exactly he meant by it. I suppose it’s got
something to do with posthuman politics. By affirming the existence of men and
women, I probably committed to some sort of hierarchy between the two, inviting
people to think that if women are really in some substantial way different from
men, then perhaps men are justified in treating them differently. Or my ontological
claim was tantamount to saying that every person must be either male or female,
that nobody can be both or neither, and if there are persons that seem to be
both or neither, then they need to be ostracized as monsters, assigned to
either of the two categories, or changed in such a way that they can plausibly
be regarded as either male or female. Needless to say, that was not what I had
intended to convey.
It
seems to me that we should be able to make claims about the existence of
differences without thereby making certain normative commitments. I’m more than
happy to concede that there exist, or may exist, people who are neither male
nor female, people who are both, people who are biologically male but feel
female and vice versa, and who knows what else. And as far as I’m concerned,
they can all live merrily and do whatever they damn well please. It’s none of
my business, and I’m not partial. But that doesn’t change anything about the fact
that some people are actually men and some others are actually women, and that
most people are either men or women, and I don’t really see anything wrong with
that. I don’t see any need to diversify the sexes through reconceptualization or
(for the more practically minded) genetic modification and thus to abolish the basic
sexual dimorphism characteristic of our species. That is probably because I’m
fine with being a man.
I
can assure you I’m not blind to the fact that many of the differences that we see
between the sexes are socially constructed. My point is not that there is still
a biological foundation to the distinction between male and female (although I
find it hard to understand how that can be denied), but rather that socially
constructed differences are as real for us as biological differences. The distinction
is not so much ontological as experiential. In our life-world, in the way we
experience the world, men and women undoubtedly exist. And so do animals and
machines, subjects and objects, the self and the other, the human and the
non-human, the living and the dead, adults and children. Those differences are
real. It may be theoretically possible to structure the world differently, to
pay more attention to other differences and less to these, but it is very hard
to actually live by an alternative (non-dualistic) ontology. Even posthumanists
act like humanists most of the time, simply because it would be very difficult
not to. You may fervently deny that there is any relevant difference between
human agency and the agency of things, but you will probably not try to
convince your furniture of this. Instead you will give a talk at an academic
conference, where you will talk to other humans, who will politely listen to
you, one human (in most cases male or female) subject talking to other (again
mostly male or female) human subjects. Inanimate objects and animals (several
cats and dogs who appeared to be living in the university buildings) were
ignored, on solid humanist grounds. And during the breaks people visited the
toilets. There were two kinds, one for women and one for men, which I’m sure is
very oppressive, but it actually worked. Nobody seemed to be confused by it. I
wonder why that is.
Excelent piece! I'm sure biologists would add a couple of things, and thus make your distinguished Spanish colleague chase Biology away from their Book of Righteous Posthumanism
ReplyDeleteThank you, Alex. I'm sure they would.
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